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TESTIMONY
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 TESTIMONY
Antecedents and
Implications of the
November 2008 Lashkar-
e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon
Several Targets in the
Indian Mega-City of
Mumbai
C. CHRISTINE FAIR
CT-320
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March 2009
Testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on
March 11, 2009
 Published 2009 by the RAND Corporation
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C. Christine Fair
1
The RAND Corporation
Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon
Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai
2
,
3
Before the Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection
United States House of Representatives
March 11, 2009
Introduction
On November 23, 2008 ten Pakistani terrorists associated with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)/Jamaat ul
Dawa (JuD), operating in four attack teams, rampaged across some ten different targets in the
Indian port city of Mumbai. In part due to the complexities of the counterterrorist operations, the
tenacity and training of the attackers, and the inadequate capabilities of the Indian security forces,
it took some four days to end the terrorist campaign which claimed the lives of at least 172 victims.
In this testimony, I have been asked to focus upon four specific concerns emerging from this
attack and its perpetrators. First, I contextualize LeT among the proliferating expanse of militant
groups operating in and from Pakistan. Second, I provide specific information about LeT, the
militant group responsible for this and many other attacks within India. Third, I draw out both the
antecedents and innovations of the 2008 Mumbai attack. I conclude with a discussion of some of
the important implications that emerge from this and other LeT activities for regional and
international security generally and U.S. security in particular.
While LeT was banned in 2002, the LeT began operating under the banner of JuD, which was
overtly operational until the Pakistan government formally banned it following immense
international pressure in late 2008, including a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that JuD is
a terrorist organization. In the service of brevity, I use LeT and JuD somewhat synonymously
even though there are a few important technical differences.
4
1
The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be
interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the
RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to
federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private
review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective
analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the
world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
2
This testimony is available for free download at
3
The author is grateful to Peter Chalk, Lisa Curtis, James Dobbins, and Praveen Swami who reviewed
earlier drafts of this testimony.
4
Technically, LeT remained the militant wing while JuD engaged in a wider array of charitable activities such
as establishing hospitals, clinics, schools, and madrassah and other poverty relief activities. Since LeT was
1
Pakistan’s Myriad Militants: Situating Lashkar-e-Taiba
Pakistan has given rise to numerous militant groups in recent decades that operate to secure
Pakistan’s state interests in India and Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan has sustained numerous
covert operations campaigns in Indian-administered Kashmir since 1947.
5
Many—if not most—of
these militant groups have enjoyed the specific patronage of the Pakistani state intelligence and
military agencies to prosecute Islamabad’s interests in India (with particular focus upon Kashmir)
and Afghanistan.
6
These varied militant groups, until circa 2002, could largely be disaggregated
according to religious ideology (school of Islamic thought) and operational goals.
7
Among Pakistan’s various Islamic interpretative schools, the Deobandi school of thought claims
the most militant groups. Key Deobandi militant groups include the Taliban (Afghan and the
Pakistani), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami (HUJI), Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen (HUA/HUM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan (SSP) among
numerous offshoots. The Deobandi tradition emerged as a puritanical movement to uplift Muslims
by purifying Islamic practice through discouraging mystical beliefs such as intercession by saints
and veneration of graves and shrines. Deobandi institutions, notably a burgeoning archipelago of
Deobandi madaris across the Pashtun belt and beyond, received support from the Pakistani
government and others to produce mujahideen for Afghanistan both in the Soviet and post-Soviet
periods.
8
These Deobandi militant groups also have enjoyed both close connections to and
overlapping membership with Deobandi political organizations including personalized factions of
the
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI). Until the February 2008 elections, JUI factions comprised
outlawed, it largely operated under the umbrella of JuD. Proponents of JuD’s innocence assert the
separation of the organizations.
5
In their most maximal objectives, these campaigns have aimed to wrest from New Delhi the portion of
Kashmir which it administers. (India controls about two-thirds of the collective area known as Jammu and
Kashmir.) These campaigns have sought to secure Pakistani sovereignty over the expanse of the disputed
territory. In their most minimalist objectives, these campaigns have sought to “bleed India” by requiring it
sustain a large (often locally resented) counter-insurgency grid in Jammu and Kashmir. For a discussion of
the various covert campaigns, see Praveen Swami.
Indian Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in
Kashmir, 1947-2004
(London: Routledge, 2006).
6
Ashley J. Tellis writes on this point that “In fact, of all the Pakistani- sponsored Deobandi [sic] terrorist
groups operating against India in Kashmir and elsewhere, only one entity— the Hizbul Mujahideen— began
life as an indigenous Kashmiri insurgent group; the others, including the most violent organizations such as
the Lashkar- e-Toiba, the Jaish- e- Muhammad, and the Harkat- ul- Mujahideen, are all led, manned, and
financed by native Pakistanis.” See Ashley J. Tellis,
Pakistan and the War on Terror Conflicted Goals,
Compromised Performance
(Washington D.C.: CEIP, 2008), p. 5. Also see among numerous other sources
Ahmed Rashid,
Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central
Asia
(New York: Penguin, 2009); See Husain Haqqani,
Pakistan Between and Military
(Washington D.C.: CEIP,
2005); Hassan Abbas and Jessica Stern,
Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America's
War Terror
(New York: M.E. Sharpe 2004).
7
This draws from C. Christine Fair, "Who Are Pakistan's Militants and Their Families?"
Terrorism and
Political Violence
, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January, 2008).
8
Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: Penguin, 2004). Pakistan developed and supported Islamist
proxies in Afghanistan
before
the Soviet invasion by mobilizing those Islamists who had been ousted by
President Daud after 1973.
2
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